STRAUSS: PEDAGOGY FOR A THEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION

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The Challenge of the Enlightenment

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Describing the effects of the Enlightenment on "positive religion," Hegel wrote in the *Phenomenology of Spirit:*

> ... being now an invisible and imperceptible Spirit, it infiltrates the noble parts through and through and soon has taken possession of all the vitals and members of the unconscious idol; then "one fine morning it gives its comrade a shove with the elbow, and bang! crash! the idol lies on the floor." On "one fine morning" whose noon is bloodless if the infection has penetrated to every organ of spiritual life. Memory alone then still preserves the dead form of the Spirit's previous shapes as a vanished history, vanished one knows not how. And the new serpent of wisdom raised on high for adoration has in this way painlessly cast merely a withered skin.[1]

Positive religion was regarded by the Enlightenment as a source of superstition in its affirming a correspondence between the object of faith and its representation. The believer's surrender to the spell of this idol was the last betrayal of truth; in fact, it was the denial of that for which it stood. The Enlightenment represented the dawn of an apocalyptic epistemology whose prophets had finally recognized the "dead form of Spirit's previous shapes as a vanished history," as prehistory, as the withered skin of the "new serpent of wisdom."

The paradox of the Enlightenment, perceptively depicted by Hegel, was that it ended up denying that which it started affirming: freedom. Its apocalyptic epistemology performed the reversal of all values including its own grounding insight. The negation of all positivity as the spurious source of superstition has finally corroded the texture of history and affirmed itself in the rarified atmosphere of pure action, action that denies not only all positivity but its own efficacy as well: "The sole work and deed of universal freedom is therefore *death*, a death too which has no inner significance or filling, for what is negated is the empty point of the absolutely free itself."[2]

Informed by and building on Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, David Friedrich Strauss (1808-72) sought to redefine the theological endeavor so as to avoid the dogmatic repristination of positive Christianity with its myths, doctrines, and symbols that the Enlightenment had so fiercely and, to a certain extent, successfully destroyed, and the dead-end of the Enlightenment's apocalyptic. His venture was marked by a tactical and pedagogical awareness of the dormant critical and creative possibilities of theology. The subject-matter of theology was for him the Christian representations (*Vorstellungen*) which he defined as "the believing certainty and its object: the religious tradition *qua* dogma and sacred history."[3] In the junction between "believing certainty and its object" Strauss found the birthplace of the religious phenomenon in general and of Christianity in particular, according to its proper stories and traditions. The central problem of his theology was one that he shared with other Hegelians: the relationship between and the reconciliation of faith and knowledge, Christianity and history. But he was the first Hegelian to abandon an *a priori* presumption of this reconciliation and to understand it dialectically as a process achieved through means of criticism. "The true criticism of dogma," he wrote, "is its history."[4]

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For Strauss, historical criticism was the endeavor that could discern the relative value of history in its process of development. In history, he would find only the withered skins of the serpent of wisdom, but they were the essential indication of its hidden nature. He did not want to escape from the charges of the Enlightenment into inner religious affections and feelings. Either Christianity had an historical though relative import, or nothing of it was worthwhile saving. In his doctoral dissertation (1831) he showed his disappointment with Schleiermacher, the leading theologian at the time, influential in Strauss's theological formation, precisely at this point: "It is regrettable that here [in Schleiermacher's theology] the insertion of *apokatastasis* in the temporal dimension is lost; perhaps the Hegelian school can be here of help."[5] There, in history, in the data that it presented for consciousness, was the record of a process in which the destiny of the world was being revealed. The analysis and criticism of this record provide the critic with an orientation as to the trend of events. Each historical moment, including the Christ event, was regarded by him as relative to any other historical datum, and its truth was to be found in the underlying unity of the entire process. The novelty that made each moment unique and irreducible was regarded as evidence of the divine substance unfolding itself.

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Representation and the Believer

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Strauss himself was willing to admit his indebtedness to Hegel by saying that the latter was behind his own masterpiece, the *Life of Jesus*: "My criticism of the life of Jesus stands from its origin in inner relationship with Hegelian philosophy."[6] And Strauss credited Hegel's influence on him further:

> . . . In my university years the most important point of this [Hegel's] system for theology appeared to me to be the distinction between representation [*Vorstellung*] and the concept [*Begriff*] in religion, which with different forms can indeed have the same content.[7]

This problem became the central axis of Strauss's thinking. In 1830-31, while serving a parish and completing his doctoral dissertation, his concern with the historical determination of the gospel and of the Christian tradition and their relations to modern culture, became for him the most important theological problem.

In order to explain the relevance of Strauss's solution to the problem of the relationship between religious representations (as historical data and

believing assent to it) and philosophical conceptuality (or speculative criticism, as Strauss would prefer to call it) we will have to describe briefly how the conservative Hegelians (whom Strauss first called "right wing" Hegelians[8]) understood it. Although they recognized the same problem, the solutions were different. And it was against the right wing Hegelians that Strauss defined his theological position.[9]

When Carl Friedrich Göschel (1784-1861), an exponent of the conservative faction of Hegelianism in the 1830s, wrote his most influential book,[10] he was uncomfortably suspicious of Hegel's proposed transition from religious representations to philosophical concepts. Although an apologist of Hegel (and of pietism) he feared that "at the end the truth of revealed religion [Christianity], conceptually expressed in this [Hegelian] philosophy, would be different from the one immediately given in the representation."[11] Göschel's operative model, one which he would have liked to see accepted as the true interpretation of the relationship between representation and the concept, was based on Rosenkranz's theory of translation. According to this theory, religious representations and philosophical concepts are two languages that, although using different words, describe the same referent. For one who knows both languages (i.e., the theologian), the alternative modes of expression are tautologies.[12] Göschel's fear was that the conceptual language could render the religious language obsolete, and thus would dissociate a theological intellectual elite from the religious community.

A similar position was held by Philipp Konrad Marheineke (1780-1846), a leading theologian in Berlin and a close associate of Hegel. As much as Göschel's fear was an augury on the fate of conservative Hegelianism, the following words of Marheineke, spoken after the impact of Strauss and those who followed him, were its epitaph: "Our situation is serious, this blow we will not overcome."[13]

For Marheineke, Christianity possessed in its representations the essential content of truth: "In the teachings of the Scripture and of the Church the Christian truths are given and presented to us, and the rational faith has in such representations the sufficient truth and the truth itself."[14]

The task of dogmatic theology as a "scientific" (*wissenschaftlich*) enterprise is one of elucidating and clarifying the truth that is already contained in the religious representations.[15] Hence there is nothing that theology can add or subtract from the religious convictions as such. Theology repristinates religion and defends it against any attack. It also makes sure that, even when criticized

and abandoned, the way back to traditional religious representations will be assured, for "the end of religion is its beginning as well."[16]

Both Göschel and Marheineke continually took pains to explain the necessity of making the transition from the representation to the concept in a way that could secure the awareness of the fact that conceptual language could never be autonomous, since the "miracle of faith" (Göschel) cannot be exhausted by philosophical concepts.

While for Göschel and Marheineke this was primarily a theoretical problem of adjusting reason to faith, Strauss looked at the same issue from another angle. His was a practical problem: How is faith transformed and challenged by historical reason? In his close contact with pastoral practice, he perceived a great irony in the proposition of those who were trying to defend faith with reason. What in the theologian's eye was a defense of faith was being viewed by the believer as an attack on faith, a purposeless travesty.

For Strauss, it was clear that "the people are not prepared for the concept," and he suggested that a preacher should be cautious, take this fact into serious consideration, talk to the congregation "with representations" whenever necessary, and hence "let the concept shine through the representation as much as possible."[17] In his parish work Strauss discovered in the reluctance of believers to make the transition from representation to the concept, a sign that something more profound was involved in this transition than the speculative theologians were able to perceive. In practical terms, Strauss perceived with phenomenological sensibility that the proposed translation theory did not represent as much a positive contribution of philosophy to religion as it represented the destruction of something that could be preserved only in the religious representation. In this analysis he was in agreement with orthodox and pietist theologians, and opposed to the speculations of Marheineke and Göschel. But if he was in agreement with orthodox and pietist Christians in diagnosing the illness, he opposed them in the medication he recommended. If something was lost in the transition from the representation to the concept, it was probably worthwhile losing.

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The Divine Occasion

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What distinguished Strauss from his opponents within Hegelianism was already manifested in his early writings, which were marked by a relentless rejection of an accommodation that would have thrown him into the unhappy condition of languishing in a constant unrest of permanent becoming. The transition from belief in the representation to the knowledge of the concept is a constant movement and source of unrest that elicits the desire for satisfaction. In the famous "Concluding Dissertation" at the end of his *Life of Jesus*, Strauss stated:

> the most firmly believing Christian has within himself the elements of criticism as a latent deposit of unbelief, or rather as a negative germ of knowledge, and only by its constant repression can he maintain the predominance of his faith.[18]

Strauss went on to say, ". . . just as a believer is intrinsically a skeptic or critic, so, on the other hand, the critic is intrinsically a believer."[19] This intrinsic faith, although it stands in an inverted relation to knowledge, is quite peculiar to Strauss's Hegelianism. Religion or Christianity is not a mere deception, and Strauss evoked the authority of Hegel to support his view that the representation of Jesus Christ is the "starting point for mind [Geist]."[20] Indeed, Strauss followed the christology of other speculative theologians up to a certain point. He agreed that the idea has to have reality and not be a mere intellectual category without any material relation to the phenomenal world, as it was the case in Kant. But this realization is not tied to one individual. At this point Strauss stood in opposition to the conservative Hegelian theologians who contended that the idea would not be real if its total realization is not found in one historical individual. Against them Strauss said:

> This is indeed not the mode in which Idea realizes itself; it is not wont to lavish all its fulness on one exemplar, and be niggardly toward all others . . . it rather loves to distribute its richness among a multiplicity of exemplars which reciprocally complete each other.[21]

Strauss continued by suggesting that Schelling's notion of the "incarnation of God from eternity" may be truer than an "incarnation limited to a particular point in time."[22] In this sense, Strauss was accepting Hegel's insistence that God is not envious, for the divine imparts and shares its being. And for this reason, Strauss went also beyond Schelling by recognizing that in different individuals God is manifested differently. As in Hegel, there are some individuals who bring segments of historical processes to culmination. The particular individual Jesus is, in this regard, the culmination of a process that established the starting point for the realization that the idea of the unity between God and humanity is a thinkable concept which will find in humanity the actual fulfillment of the *unio hypostatica* that is only implicitly present in Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus is the latent possibility of the actual universal Christ,

humanity. With Jesus the representation of Christ became possible, and for this reason it became possible for humanity to reflect upon it and to realize it within itself. "Humanity is the union of the two natures—God becomes man, the infinite manifesting itself in the finite, and the finite remembering its infinitude."[23]

It is through the finite manifestation or externalization of the divine substance in one individual that humanity realizes its own destiny. The representation of Christ is the project of humanity. But only because we have the representation of God emerging from the deepest reality of human existence is humanity reminded of its divinity and so can be aware of itself and find its way into infinity:

> This alone is the absolute content of Christology: that it appears annexed to the person and history of one individual, . . . that this individual through its personality and destiny became the occasion [Anlass] to raise that [absolute] content into the universal consciousness.[24]

The methodological path that Strauss followed here can be better understood if the historico-phenomenological approach to the problem of representation in Hegel is kept in mind. Like Hegel, Strauss correlated the emergence of representation to historical and empirical perception and to the consciousness of alienation. Consciousness evokes an external object which is endowed with all the attributes of the substance that are regarded as being external to consciousness and unrelated to it. The subject is the discrete other. However, this situation reaches a point of reversion in which consciousness sees the external manifestation of its own essential reality in this other (because it participates in the life of spirit) and inverts its apprehension by transforming the other into the predicate of self-consciousness. At this point consciousness reaches certainty of its own self.

Hence, for Strauss, the death of Jesus marks the limit situation in which humanity can finally realize itself as implicitly divine and raise itself into the life of spirit by proclaiming the human species to be the fulfillment of the idea of the unity of God and humanity. The death of God is the occasion (Anlass) for the "resurrection" of human history, although this "resurrection" is a long and painful process, or even "an unending process,"[25] which no believer can simplify without being unfair to the historical Jesus.

In Strauss's view, the sensuous, empirical side of representation is what remains of the historical Jesus, while its counterpart, the intellectual or imaginative side of representation (the notion of Christ), has its locus in human imagination. Hence the events that are not historically verifiable (resurrection, ascension, virgin birth, the miracles, and

such like) are predicates of human subjectivity. If this is not recognized, argued Strauss, we will remain bound to myths, for a myth is a confusion of the sensuous component of a representation with its intellectual or imaginative element. Although the sensuous component is constitutive for knowledge, or is the occasion that elicits it, its infinite meaning, as in the case of Jesus Christ, is not alien to the human spirit:

> But once mind [Geist] seizes the opportunity afforded to it by this external fact to bring into consciousness the idea of humanity as one with God, and sees only the presentation of that idea in history, the object of faith is completely changed. Instead of a sensible, empirical fact, it has become a spiritual [or intellectual] and divine idea which is no longer confirmed in history but in philosophy.[26]

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Myth and Criticism

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For Strauss the mythological interpretation of the Christian representation belongs to the negative or critical moment of his theology. What concerns him most is the reversal of consciousness that takes place when the mind imposes upon an historical event a universal meaning. Strauss established two negative and two positive criteria for recognizing a myth.

The first negative criterion is that all representations that contradict ontological "laws" (relationships between primary and secondary causes), historical "laws" (relationships between cause and effect), and epistemological "laws" (analogical relations), are mythological.[27] The second negative criterion refers to the internal consistency of the structure of the narrative in which the representation is present, or to its consistency with parallel accounts.[28]

The positive criteria for recognizing a myth can be established either by the content or the form of the narrative. According to the form, a narrative is mythological if it uses poetic imagery which, according to its structure and on the basis of the interpreter's knowledge of the intellectual training of the author, cannot be attributed to him or her. According to the content, one is able to establish the mythological character of a narrative, even if there is no poetic imagery, if it "accords with certain ideas [Vorstellungen] existing and prevailing within the circle from which the narrative proceeded."[29]

In Strauss's opinion, a myth is that which seems "to be the product of preconceived opinions rather than experience."[30] Thus myths are representations that have detached themselves from historical ex-

perience. They are repetitions of already existing images that are imposed on *new* historical experiences. Christian mythology is, for Strauss, the modification of the Jewish messianic expectations that were applied to the historical Jesus.

Strauss's critical program entails an analysis of representation which distinguishes between the experiential historical source, on the one hand, and the intellectual or imaginative source, on the other. The myth takes the crystalized form of the latter and imposes it on experience, thus suppressing the source of creativity that grows out of historical experience.

Hence, criticism is understood by Strauss in its etymological sense: it is the *crisis*, the discernment, and the division of the component parts. On this basis we can grasp Strauss's notion of negation as the establishment of the *crisis* (i.e., criticism) that elicits from the dismemberment it causes, the awareness that it is human consciousness that attributes meaning to the sensuous component of representation. Only when consciousness starts to unveil the contradictions of representation does it know that the static arrangement of contradictory elements in representation was already the denial of the life of spirit.

The true power of a representation and its importance lies in the power of the historical event that elicits it. In the myth the process is inverted. Thus only exposure to the powerful personality and consciousness of the historical Jesus is the occasion (*Anlass*) that reminds humanity of its own powerful though only implicit identity with the divine. Two extremes, however, must be avoided, namely, one which concludes that if Jesus as Christ is the absolute realization of the idea, then any human liberation beyond the historical accomplishments of Jesus becomes irrelevant; and another which states that the historical Jesus was an individual like any other, resulting in humanity lacking an actual occasion that would be capable of explaining the emergence of the idea of his divine nature in the history of humanity.

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Strauss's Myth

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Strauss regarded representation as the mediation between historical consciousness and human self-consciousness, between the particular and universal. As a result, he understood it to be implicitly (in-itself) a pedagogical instrument, although explicitly (for-itself) it assumed a mythological and alienating

function. This mythological function must be exorcised, i.e., representation should be brought into a crisis whereby the historical in it is distinguished from the imaginative. This discernment would then release human reason to comprehend the fact that the truth lies on neither side, but rather in the encounter of the two. This truth is presented by the concept of the divine-human unity and is realized (viz. revealed) by its concrete *becoming* in humanity.[31] This becoming of humanity is teleologically oriented toward the identity (*in fieri*) of history and the divine reality. But this identity becomes mythological when presented in the representation "kingdom of God," for then it entails for the believer only a transcendent future entity with no historical relevance. "The beyond is indeed the enemy. When it assumes the form of the future, it is the last enemy against which speculative criticism must fight and which, whenever possible, it must overcome."[32]

It is surprising, however, that Strauss's argument lacks an assessment of the origination of representations as such. If the problem with mythology is that it imposes a crystalized image on a new historical experience, it is assumed that the original representation cannot be criticized as mythological. Strauss could rightly be criticized for falling into a *reductio ad absurdum*, whereby each representation would be a crystalization of a previous one, and so on *ad infinitum*.

Strauss's failure to present a constructive theological proposition is due to two correlated reasons.

In the first place, although myth was regarded as a special function of representation, Strauss never seemed able to elaborate this distinction nor to recognize that representation functions in still other ways. Phenomenologically the source of the myth lies in a pre-existing image (e.g., the messiah) that is connected with a particular historical event (viz. the life and person of Jesus), and that imposes upon it its universal meaning (Jesus is the messiah of God). When asked how this representation came into being in the first place, Strauss would appeal to the concept of tradition. But if the argument were to be pursued further, he would have to explain how the tradition itself emerged. By arguing that the origin of representation is mythological, rather than being a product of historical experience raised to self-consciousness and represented through the work of a creative imagination, Strauss's critique of the mythological approach enters into a *regressus ad infinitum*. He was ingenious in denouncing the fact that the myth presupposes a crystalized universe of meanings and values which is imposed upon historical events, but he was unable to explain the origin of

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this universe of meanings in its connection with historical experience and factuality. Conversely, Strauss is also unable to explain the emergence of new representations that function in a non-mythological way. It is only the non-mythological function of representation that fosters the pedagogical process that Strauss was defending. His critical pathos consumed the energy he could have expended to elaborate a constructive theory of representation that was in fact implicit in his theology.

Secondly, by restricting representation to its mythological function, Strauss developed only the negative side of the mediation in his theology. The transition from mythical consciousness to the self-consciousness of the becoming divine-human unity in humanity was actually framed by the apocalyptic epistemology of the Enlightenment, to which he did not want to succumb. His critical pathos led him to the belief that the destruction of all myths would inevitably leave humankind at the threshold of a new humanity, the humanity of the concept, self-conscious humanity. Strauss betrayed his pedagogical program by reducing representation more and more to its mythological and alienating function, even to the point where it was destroyed by the hosts of the spiritual concept. This apocalyptic tendency contradicts Strauss's "ontology of the not-yet-being"[33] in an "unending process."[34] In order to sustain this notion of process, he would have had to develop a constructive role for representation as the occasions that constantly mediate the becoming of the consciousness of freedom. The result of his apocalyptic epistemology lacked any mediation. Furthermore, concept became transformed into myth. The self-consciousness of the unity of the divine and the human in humanity is by Strauss's own definition a myth, i.e., it lacks foundation in historical experience and it is a crystalized conception whose meaning is imposed on an abstract humanity. Strauss's demythologizing in fact culminates in a remythologizing. The leap from myth to the absolute concept was an inconsistency that Strauss blindly followed only to substitute one myth for another. It was this inconsistency, and not the logical consequence of Strauss's program, that made him dig deeper into the abyss of his unhappiness.

Strauss's criticism of representation foreshadows Marx's criticism of ideology.[35] What it lacks, however, is a material criterion for discerning between the consciousness raising and the consciousness alienating function of representation. Although implicitly present in Strauss's concept of historical experience and particularly in his notion of the memory of Jesus as the occasion for the con-

sciousness of human liberation, it was not developed.[36]

Pedagogy and the Tactics of Historical Truth

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Strauss was never able to incorporate systematically the constructive function of the genesis of representations into his theology. Nonetheless, he did find in representation a necessary mediation between faith and historical knowledge and saw in it not only a mythological debasement, but a pedagogical function as well. It is this pedagogical process fostered by representations that can enhance the human project, namely, the becoming of the absolute in history. Only by recovering this positive function of representations is it possible to understand Strauss's solution to the problem he presented in his *Life of Jesus*: how can humanity achieve awareness of its own spiritual essence if it is alienated in religious mythology? He framed his solution for this dilemma by building a typology that addresses and criticizes four possible solutions to the problem.[37]

In the first, representation is accepted at face value and functions as a myth; therefore there is no critical discernment of the component elements of the myth. This is the position that is taken by naive believers and defended by orthodox theologians. The second expresses the incompatibility of religion and theology, but does not relate them. This type of attitude reflects a sort of theological schizophrenia that can be observed in the case of a rationalist who preaches like a pietist.[38] The third expresses the incompatibility of religious and critical reason and rejects the former. The fourth solution is the one that Strauss assumes. In the case of a preacher,

> ... he will indeed adhere to the forms of the popular conception [*Vorstellung*], but on every opportunity he will exhibit their Spiritual significance which to him constitutes their sole truth, and thus prepare — though such a result is only to be thought of as an unending process — the resolution of those forms into their original ideas in the consciousness of the Church also.[39]

Such a tactical and pedagogical use of representation and its criticism is a necessity for Strauss's universal actualization of the divine. In Strauss, this actualization has to pass through the criticism of religious representations in order to raise humankind to the consciousness of its infinity which, in turn, is the presupposition of the incarnation. It is therefore necessary to carry the criticism of representation *qua* myth to its ultimate conse-

quences by revealing the internal contradictions of myth (i.e., the mixture of sensuous or historical data with the attributes of creative imagination that are taken from crystalized images). Similarly to Marheineke and Göschel, Strauss also affirms that representation gives rise to reason and to the historical consciousness of freedom; but in contrast to them, he asserts that reason is not restricted to the confirmation of the truth that faith recognizes in representation. In Strauss, critical reasoning liberates itself from representation without denying its heuristic value; it functions as a medium and not as an end in itself.

If for Feuerbach the essence of theology is anthropology, for Strauss the true essence of theology is pedagogy. As Feuerbach regarded theology to be a debased anthropology, Strauss regretted that it had become a debased pedagogy, "a science of the idiots."[40] For Strauss, theology has the task of raising humanity into the immanence of its own self-consciousness. And in performing this task, its main tool is a scalpel that cuts into the religious representations and dissects them into their components. Theology is a class in anatomy where humanity learns that the dead bodies, i.e., the representations which lie on the table, are at the same time a strange other and humanity itself. When humanity attends the class of Strauss the "anatomist," watching with astonishment what his scalpel reveals, it becomes more conscious of its own self. Yet, in Strauss, it remains as an abstract self.

Notes

1. G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller with analysis of text and Foreword by J. N. Findlay (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 332 (§545). The inserted quotation is from Diderot's *Nephew of Rameau*.
2. Ibid., p. 360 (§590).
3. David Friedrich Strauss, *Streitschriften zur Vertheidigung meiner Schrift über das Leben Jesu und zur Charakteristik der gegenwärtigen Theologie*, 3 vols. (Tübingen: C. F. Osiander, 1837), 3:61.
4. Idem, *Die christliche Glaubenslehre in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und im Kampfe mit der modernen Wissenschaft dargestellt*, 2 vols. (Tübingen: C. F. Osiander; Stuttgart: F. H. Koehler, 1840-41), 1:71.
5. Idem, *Die Lehre von der Wiederbringung aller Dinge in ihrer religionsgeschichtlichen Entwicklung dargestellt*, in *Identität und Immanenz. Zur Genese der Theologie von David Friedrich Strauss*, by Gotthold Müller (Zürich: EVZ-Verlag, 1968), p. 81.
6. Idem, *Streitschriften*, 3:57.
7. Ibid. The central importance in Strauss's theology of the Hegelian relation between representation (*Vorstellung*) and the concept (*Begriff*) is widely recognized by researchers. See, e.g., Joerg F. Sandberger, *David Friedrich Strauss als*

theologischen Hegelianer. Mit unveröffentlichten Briefen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972), pp. 35 and 157; Müller, Identität und Immanenz, p. 27; Karl Löwith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Der revolutionäre Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts. Marx und Kierkegaard, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1950), p. 357; Marilyn Chapin Massey, "David Friedrich Strauss and His Hegelian Critics," The Journal of Religion 57 (October 1977):352.
8. Strauss, *Streitschriften*, 3:95-126.
9. Also determinant for the formation of Strauss's theological program was the emergence of the revival movement (*Erweckungsbewegung*) (see Erich Beyreuther, *Die Erweckungsbewegung* [Göttingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963]) and the development of the empirical methodology in the natural sciences (see Stephen G. Brush, "Thermodynamics and History," *The Graduate Journal* 7 [Spring 1967]:479-89). See also Jürgen Gebhardt, *Politik und Eschatologie. Studien zur Geschichte der Hegelschen Schule in den Jahren 1830-1840* (München: C. H. Beck'sche, 1963), p. 84.
10. Carl Friedrich Göschel, *Aphorismen über Nichtwissen und absolutes Wissen in Verhältnisse zur christlichen Glaubenserkenntnis. Ein Beitrag zum Verständnisse der Philosophie unserer Zeit* (Berlin: Franklin Verlag, 1829).
11. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
12. See Karl Rosenkranz, *Enzyklopädie der theologischen Wissenschaften*, 2nd ed. (Halle: C. A. Schetschke und Sohn, 1845), p. 84.
13. Cited in *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, 3rd ed., s.v. "Marheineke, Philipp Konrad," by G. Frank.
14. Philipp Konrad Marheineke, *Die Grundlehren der christlichen Dogmatik als Wissenschaft*, 2nd totally reworked ed. (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1927), p. 60 (§105).
15. Idem, *Einleitung in die öffentliche Vorlesungen über die Bedeutung der Hegelschen Philosophie in der christlichen Theologie* (Berlin: Th. Chr. Fr. Enslin, 1842), p. 57.
16. Idem, *Dogmatik*, p. 396 (§616).
17. Strauss to Christian Marklin, 26 December 1830, in Sandberger, *Strauss als theologischen Hegelianer*, p. 171.
18. David Friedrich Strauss, *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined*, ed. and with an Introduction by Peter C. Hodgson, trans. Mary Ann Evans [George Eliot] (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), p. 757.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p. 780.
21. Ibid., pp. 779-80.
22. Ibid. Cf F. W. J. Schelling, *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums*, ed. and with an Introduction by Walter E. Ehrhardt (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1974), p. 92.
23. Strauss, *Life of Jesus*, p. 780.
24. David Friedrich Strauss, *Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet*, 2 vols. (Tübingen: C. F. Osiander, 1835-36), 2:735. We quote the first German edition because this passage occurs only in the first and second editions; it is omitted in the third and fourth editions. The Evans' translation was based on the fourth edition.
25. Idem. *Life of Jesus*, p. 783.
26. Ibid., pp. 780-81.
27. Ibid., pp. 87-88. This notion of "laws" is not purely rationalistic, as many interpreters want to affirm. The historical and epistemological "laws," in particular, should not be regarded as absolute criteria because they are unable to account for the experience of novelty and should, therefore, be "cautiously applied" (ibid., p. 88):
28. Ibid., pp. 88-89.
29. Ibid., p. 89.

30. Ibid. In addition to myth as such, Strauss also distinguishes the "legends" within non-historical material, which can be best described as myths with variegated and oddly combined contents, and the "additions by the author" which are "designed merely to give clarity, connection, and climax to the representation" (ibid., p. 87).

31. See idem, *Streitschriften*, 3:74 where he identifies "the category of becoming" as the speculative expression of the concept of revelation. Thus he can also say that "the incarnation of God is a becoming" (*das Menschwerdung Gottes ist eines Werdens*); ibid., 3:69.

32. Strauss, *Glaubenslehre*, 2:739.

33. The ontological conception of the not-yet-being (*Nochnichtsein*) that is normally associated with the name of Ernst Bloch is in fact an original formulation of Strauss, *Streitschriften*, 3:69, 99.

34. Idem, *Life of Jesus*, p. 783. This "apocalyptic" tendency is manifested in his statement: "As long as man alienates himself, or spirit has not become powerful and internalized in him, he cannot find the source of his activity and of his situation in himself, but he finds it only where he has misplaced his spirit, namely, outside of himself." (idem, *Glaubenslehre*, 2:75).

35. Marx and Engels, *German Ideology* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), pp. 34-36, 41-43.

36. If we now want to find such a criterion being elaborated in theology we might have to look at Latin American theology which, with its ideological approach to Christian representations, is through Marx's theory of ideology addressing anew and in a promising way the problem that Strauss left unresolved. See, e.g., Juan Luis Segundo, *Liberation of Theology*, trans. John Drury (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1976), pp. 7-38; idem, *Faith and Ideologies*, trans. John Drury (Maryknoll: Orbis; Melbourne: Dove Communications; London: Sheed and Ward, 1984); Hugo Assmann, *Teología desde la praxis de la liberación: Ensayo teológico desde la América dependiente*, 2nd ed. (Salamanca: Sígueme, 1976) pp. 171-202.

37. Strauss, *Life of Jesus*, pp. 732-84. A similar typology can be found also in a letter of Strauss to Christian Märklin, dated 26 December 1830, in Sandberger, *Strauss als theologischen Hegelianer*, p. 169-71.

38. Strauss is probably thinking about the New Testament scholar Paulus. But the same could apply to Schleiermacher if we consider the rhetorical and conceptual differences between his sermons and his philosophical and theological works. Philosophical, this position was justified by Jacobi.

39. Strauss, *Life of Jesus*, p. 783.

40. Idem. *Glaubenslehre*, 2:625.